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RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF VENDORS AND GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES UNDER FLORIDA'S NEW PUBLIC
CONTRACTING LAW
DAVID L. POWELL
Until recently, vendors convicted of "bid-rigging" crimes could
continue to receive public contracts with state and local agencies. In
1989, the Legislature enacted legislation to exclude convicted vendors
from the public procurement process. In this Article, the author
examines how the standards and procedures of the new law
safeguard the public treasury while protecting vendors from unfair
interference in their transactions with state and local agencies.
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RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF VENDORS AND GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES UNDER FLORIDA'S NEW PUBLIC
CONTRACTING LAW
DAVID L. POWELL*
N RECENT years, prosecutors in Florida have aggressively sought
to enforce state and federal laws prohibiting price-fixing, customer
allocation, and other anti-competitive practices that fall under the ru-
bric of "bid-rigging." In particular, prosecutors have pursued anti-
trust offenses involving state and local government contracts for
everything from beach renourishment projects' to school lunch sup-
plies.2 During the last decade, the State alone has recovered an esti-
mated $80 million in civil damages and penalties from offending
vendors and has convicted the vendors of criminal offenses in most
cases.' Despite this, convicted vendors did not suffer even the threat
of disqualification from conducting business with state and local
agencies because these agencies must let contracts by competitive bid-
ding without considering a vendor's criminal record.4
In 1989, the Legislature enacted the Public Contracting Act5 to au-
thorize disqualification of convicted vendors. Proposed by Attorney
General Robert Butterworth after consultation with legislators and
vendors, the measure establishes legal standards, as well as a special
procedure, for determining when a vendor may be disqualified, or de-
barred, from doing business with state and local agencies in Florida
* Attorney, Hopping Boyd Green & Sams, Tallahassee, Florida. B.J., 1974, University of
Texas at Austin; M.S., 1975, Columbia University; J.D., 1986, Florida State University. Mr.
Powell, formerly Editor-in-Chief of The Florida State University Law Review, represented a
large institutional client during the development and enactment of the legislation which is the
subject of this Article.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to William D. Preston for his helpful sugges-
tions in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Suit Claims Companies Fixed Bids in Beach Project, Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 19,
1988, at D5, col. 3.
2. See Milk Producers Charged with Price-fixing, Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 8, 1989, at
IB, col. 1.
3. Staff of Fla. S., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., SB 458 (1989) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 18, 1989)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
4. Id.
5. Ch. 89-114, 1989 Fla. Laws 307 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 287.132, .133) (1989)). Al-
though the legislation has no official name, in this Article the author refers to it as the Public
Contracting Act.
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on the basis of a criminal conviction.6 The development of this com-
prehensive statute7 may be the precursor of similar laws in other
states.
This was not the first bid-rigging bill enacted by the Florida Legisla-
ture. In 1983, lawmakers enacted Chapter 83-4, Laws of Florida, in
response to a series of antitrust convictions of road contractors doing
business with the state Department of Transportation (DOT).' That
measure provided for automatic disqualification from future DOT
road work for a contractor or a related company that had been con-
victed of bid-rigging in dealings with government agencies anywhere
in the United States.9
In 1988, drawing directly from the DOT statute, Attorney General
Butterworth proposed an anti-bid-rigging bill for all other procure-
ment in Florida.' 0 The Legislature did not enact his proposal for sev-
eral reasons. Strong opposition developed from vendors who
disagreed with the Attorney General on the policy issue, or who were
concerned about technical flaws and ambiguities in the bill." In addi-
tion, legislators said other issues had a higher priority and questioned
the constitutionality of such a measure. 2
By the beginning of the 1989 Regular Session, the Attorney General
had developed a new bill to meet many of the objections. 3 This bill
represented a balanced, creative approach that asserted the public's
interest in maintaining the integrity of the government procurement
process while safeguarding vendors' interest in not being unfairly dis-
qualified from doing business with state and local agencies. The Legis-
6. See id.
7. Despite the comprehensive nature of the Act, many issues will benefit from the rule-
making process. For example, the Act requires the Department of General Services (DGS) to
promulgate certain rules to implement this statute. See, e.g., id. (codified at FLA. STAT. §
287.133(3)(a) (1989)) (requiring DGS to promulgate a form for disclosure of convictions for
public entity crimes). In addition, the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) may find it
necessary to promulgate rules for debarment proceedings. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. §
287.133(3)(e) (1989)).
8. See Ch. 83-4, 1983 Fla. Laws 45 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 337.164, .165 (1989)).
9. See id. § 2, 1983 Fla. Laws at 46 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(a)-(b) (1989)).
10. See Fla. SB 743 (1988); Fla. HB 786 (1988). Because the 1989 Act evolved from the
Attorney General's 1988 proposal, the differences between the 1989 bill and the 1988 proposal
offer some insights into legislative intent. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21, 55, 121-25.
11. See Fla. S., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., transcript of hearing at 1 (May 23, 1988) (com-
ments of Att'y Gen. Butterworth) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Re-
cords Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
12. S. Bousquet, Taking the Initiative, Miami Herald (Broward ed.), May 22, 1988, at IBP,
col. 1.
13. See Fla. SB 468 (1989); Fla. HB 647 (1989).
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lature enacted the bill with few amendments and no significant
controversy. 14
I. AGENCIES AND VENDORS COVERED BY THE ACT
As with most legislation, the definition of certain key terms is the
means by which one may determine the scope and reach of the Act.
Indeed, arriving at the definitions was perhaps the most arduous task
in the development of this legislation.
A. Agencies Within the Purview of the Act
The Act applies to virtually all business dealings by any "public en-
tity."15 Accordingly, the definition of the term "public entity" is im-
portant for determining upon which contracts the Act may prohibit a
vendor from bidding. 16 The term is also important in the context of
determining which criminal convictions may be a basis for debarment,
which related companies of a convicted vendor, or "affiliates," may
be subject to debarment, and which contracts or franchises of a de-
barred vendor may be rendered voidable in a debarment proceeding. 17
A public entity includes the State of Florida, any of its departments
or agencies, and any of its political subdivisions.18 The term "political
subdivision" is defined to include counties, cities, towns, villages, spe-
cial tax school districts, special road and bridge districts, and all other
districts created by the State.19
The definition of public entity in the Act is more concise, but more
general, than the definition of public entity in the 1988 bill. 20 In effect,
14. See Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 12, 1989,
tape 1) (statement of Rep. Michael Langton, Dem., Jacksonville) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla.
S., tape recording of proceedings (May 18, 1989, tape 3) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau
of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (remarks of Sen.
Robert Johnson, Repub., Sarasota).
15. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2) (1989));
see infra text accompanying notes 180-98 (discussing extent of disqualification).
16. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(f)
(1989)).
17. The scope of the term "public entity" is significant in part because one is not a person
under the Act unless one "bids or applies to bid on contracts for the provision of goods or
services let by a public entity, or ... otherwise transacts or applies to transact business with a
public entity." Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(e) (1989)) (emphasis added). The term
"person" in turn is a limitation on the definition of the term "affiliate," id. (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 287.133(1)(a) (1989)), and of the term "public entity crime." Id. (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 287.133(l)(g) (1989)).
18. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(f) (1989)).
19. See Fla. Stat. § 1.01(8) (1989).
20. Compare ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 287.133(1)(f) (1989)) with Fla. HB 786, § 2 (1988) (proposing FLA. STAT. § 287.31(1)(g)).
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the only change that was made was that a statutorily defined term of
art, "political subdivisions," was substituted for a longer, more un-
wieldy phrase in the 1988 bill. 2 This difference should not be inter-
preted as having any substantive significance.
A public entity, then, is any state, regional, or local governmental
body in Florida. It does not include the federal government or any
federal agency, or any other state or its agencies or political subdivi-
sions.22
B. Vendors Subject to Debarment
Two categories of vendors may be debarred under the Act.2 3 First, a
"person" convicted of certain proscribed offenses may be disqualified
from the public contracting process in Florida under the Act. 24 Sec-
ond, an "affiliate" of a convicted person also may be debarred, based
solely on the other person's conviction.
25
1. "Persons" Who May be Debarred
Generally, a "person" includes any natural person or any business
entity organized under the laws of any state or of the United States
with the legal power to enter into binding contracts. 26 The domicile of
a vendor, whether natural or corporate, is not a relevant consideration
in determining whether that vendor may be debarred.
However, a vendor must meet a further qualification in order to be
a person under the Act; that is, the vendor must be one that "bids on
or applies to bid on contracts for the provision of goods or services let
by a public entity, or . . . [that] transacts or applies to transact busi-
ness with a public entity."' 27 Because a public entity is defined as a
state or local governmental body in Florida, 28 a vendor is not a person
under the Act unless that vendor does business with a state or local
21. Compare FLA. STAT. § 1.01(8) (1989) and ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(f) (1989)) with Fla. HB 786, § 2 (1988) (proposing FLA.
STAT. § 287.31(1)(g)).
22. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(f)
(1989)); FLA. STAT. § 1.01(8) (1989)).
23. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(a) (1989)).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(e) (1989)).
27. Id. Whether a vendor is governed by the competitive bidding requirements of sections
287.052 and 287.057, Florida Statutes (1989), the Consultants' Competitive Negotiation Act, id.
§ 287.055, or some other procurement law, it would fall within the purview of the Act if it
provides "goods or services." See infra text accompanying notes 184-98.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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agency in Florida. Thus, a vendor who does not do business with such
an agency is not a person under the Act and may not be debarred. 29
If the vendor is not a natural person, however, the criminal acts of
certain officials or employees may be imputed to it. This result is
achieved by including within the definition of person all "those offi-
cers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, mem-
bers, and agents who are active in management of an entity."30 Thus,
this provision represents a balance between the needs of the public
and the needs of vendors. On the one hand, by holding vendors re-
sponsible for the acts of certain individuals, the provision creates an
incentive for large corporations to police their managers and key em-
ployees. On the other hand, allowing individual guilt to be imputed to
a business entity only when the guilty individual has been "active in
management" of the entity protects a corporation from being pun-
ished for the misdeeds of a rogue employee whose acts did not repre-
sent conscious corporate policy.
2. "Affiliates" Subject to Debarment
In some circumstances, individuals or entities other than those con-
victed of a proscribed offense may be disqualified from conducting
business with state and local agencies. Such individuals or entities are
affiliates of a convicted person.3 Here, too, acts of a responsible cor-
porate official may be imputed to the vendor, but only if that individ-
ual was "active in the management" of the affiliate.12 A person whose
conviction is the basis for an affiliate's disqualification need not be
debarred as a predicate for the affiliate being debarred.33 However,
because an affiliate may be disqualified from public procurement
without having committed a crime-in other words, strictly on the ba-
29. This geographic limitation creates an incentive for regional and national corporations to
conduct business with state and local agencies in Florida by means of separate, wholly owned
Florida subsidiaries. Such a step would prevent misdeeds by employees doing business with gov-
ernmental entities outside of Florida, regardless of whether such offenses were committed with
the knowledge of the company, from jeopardizing the vendor's business with state and local
governments in Florida.
30. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(e) (1989)).
For example, suppose Mr. X is vice-president for sales of ABC Corporation, a supplier of
widgets to various local governments in Florida. In order to make a big widget sale, Mr. X
bribes some procurement officials in Tropical County, Florida, and he is subsequently convicted.
However, for various reasons, ABC Corporation is not charged with any crime. Nevertheless,
ABC Corporation may be subject to debarment because Mr. X was an officer of the company,
active in its management, and his conviction of a public entity crime may be imputed to the
company.
31. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a) (1989)).
32. Id.
33. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(g) (1989)).
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sis of its associations-affiliate status must be demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence.3 4
The principal reason for extending the threat of debarment to affili-
ates of a convicted vendor is that this eliminates a means by which the
unscrupulous vendor could otherwise avoid the effects of disqualifica-
tion-that is, by setting up a new corporate shell and transferring the
assets of the debarred vendor to it.35
This goal is balanced against other needs. Allowing any corporate
relative anywhere in the country to be an affiliate could create the
specter of a Florida subsidiary being debarred on the basis of mis-
deeds by a small subsidiary in another part of the country. Particu-
larly in large corporations with highly decentralized management
structures, such a prospect would be highly unfair. Accordingly, a
sufficient nexus must exist between the convicted person and the Flor-
ida affiliate in order to justify disqualification of the affiliate on the
basis of its association with the convicted person. 36
For these reasons, the Act includes dual definitions of the term "af-
filiate." The purpose of each of these definitions is to prevent a con-
victed vendor from avoiding the effects of debarment merely by
creating a new business entity for the conduct of business with govern-
ment agencies.3 7 Under the first definition, an affiliate is "a predeces-
sor or successor of a person convicted of a public entity crime." ' 3
Under the second definition, an affiliate is "an entity under the con-
trol of any natural person who is active in the management of the
entity and who has been convicted of a public entity crime." ' 39
For purposes of the second definition, the Act offers two alterna-
tive tests for determining when one person controls another person-
"ownership by one person of shares constituting a controlling interest
in another person, or a pooling of equipment or income among per-
sons when not for fair market value under an arm's length agree-
ment." 4 Meeting either test is only a prima facie showing of control;
34. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4) (1989)).
35. Interview with Jerome W. Hoffman, Chief, Antitrust Section, Div. of Econ. Crimes,
Dep't of Legal Affairs (Aug. 22, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives &
Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
36. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)
(1989)).
37. Interview with Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35.
38. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(a)(1)
(1989)).
39. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)(2) (1989)).
40. Id. The first of these two tests of control is a tautology. A suitable issue to be addressed
by rule is the proportion of outstanding shares in a corporation which constitutes a controlling
interest.
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so a vendor may still adduce evidence attempting to show a control
relationship did not exist. 41 Whichever test of control is applied, the
evidence offered to establish control must satisfy the requirement for
clear and convincing evidence of affiliate status. 42
An additional provision includes certain partnerships as affiliates. It
provides that one "who knowingly enters into a joint venture with a
person who has been convicted of a public entity crime in Florida dur-
ing the preceding 36 months shall be considered an affiliate. ' 43 This
provision prevents a debarred vendor from circumventing the Act by
entering into a joint venture with a vendor who has not been de-
barred, thus creating a new entity that does not constitute an affiliate,
and which is not otherwise subject to debarment.
C. Offenses That May be a Basis for Debarment
Debarment of a person or an affiliate is triggered by a conviction of
a specified crime, which is called a "public entity crime." The nature
of the offense, who committed the offense, and the particulars of the
judicial proceeding which resulted in a conviction must be examined
in order to determine whether the offense may be a basis for debar-
ment.
1. "Public Entity Crimes"
A "public entity crime" means:
a violation of any state or federal law by a person with respect to and
directly related to the transaction of business with any public entity
or with an agency or political subdivision of any other state or with
the United States, including, but not limited to, any bid or contract
for goods or services to be provided to any public entity or an agency
or political subdivision of any other state or of the United States and
involving antitrust, fraud, theft, bribery, collusion, racketeering,
conspiracy, or material misrepresentation.'
This definition includes several salient points. First, a public entity
crime may involve a violation of any state or federal law involving
antitrust, fraud, theft, bribery, collusion, racketeering, conspiracy, or
material misrepresentation.45 Thus, a violation need not have been
41. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(5) (1989)).
42. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4) (1989)).
43. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)(2) (1989)).
44. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(g) (1989)).
45. Id.
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committed against a state or local governmental entity in Florida to be
a public entity crime.
Second, a violation must have been committed "by a person,"
meaning one who does business or seeks to do business "with a public
entity,"6 in order to be a public entity crime. Because a public entity
is a state or local government agency in Florida, 47 an offense must
have been committed by one who does business or seeks to do busi-
ness with a state or local agency in Florida for that offense to be a
public entity crime. For this reason, a violation in another state may
not be a basis for debarring anyone in Florida if the violation was
committed by one who does not do business or seek to do business
with a state or local entity in Florida.4
Third, the offense must be "directly related to" a transaction with
a public entity in order to be a public entity crime. 49 Thus, a convic-
tion for customer allocation or price-fixing which involved a govern-
ment agency only incidentally-in other words, a conviction involving
both public and private purchasers-should not constitute a public en-
tity crime.
2. "Conviction"
The term "conviction" is broadly defined. It means a finding of
guilt, or a conviction without an actual adjudication of guilt, in any
state or federal trial court of record. 0 The form of the verdict is not
significant.5 Thus, convictions after trial are not the only basis for
debarment. In particular, the Act authorizes debarment proceedings if
46. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(e) (1989)).
47. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(f) (1989)).
48. The Attorney General's Office has adopted this interpretation. Letter from Ronald
Villella, Deputy for Exec. Bus., Off. of the Att'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs, to Herbert F
Darby, City Att'y, City of Lake City, Fla. (Feb. 22, 1990) (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
Suppose Company X, a subsidiary of XYZ International, and Company W, are convicted of
Sherman Act violations for agreeing to allocate between them certain widget contracts let by
several western states. Neither Company X nor Company W does any business in Florida. How-
ever, Company Y, another subsidiary of XYZ International, regularly does business with the
State of Florida. The Sherman Act conviction is not a public entity crime because neither Com-
pany X nor Company W does business with a state or local agency in Florida. Therefore, no
one-not even Company Y-may be debarred in Florida on the basis of it.
49. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(g) (1989));
see also Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Policy & Proc., tape recording of
proceedings (Apr. 10, 1989, tape 1) (statement of Rep. Elaine Bloom, Dem., Miami Beach, dis-
cussing amendment 7 to Fla. HB 647 (1989)) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Ar-
chives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
50. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(b)
(1989)).
51. See id.
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a defendant settles a bid-rigging case with a plea of nolo contendere or
a negotiated penalty.5 2
Thus, vendors facing charges that would constitute a public entity
crime must note that a negotiated plea could subject them to a debar-
ment proceeding. Because debarment is an administrative procedure,
it would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the prosecutor or trial
court during sentencing. However, a prosecutor or court could possi-
bly take debarment into account as punishment during sentencing on
the public entity crime.
In order for a conviction to be a basis for debarment, the charges
must have been brought by indictment or criminal information after
July 1, 1989.13 This provision embodies the exclusively prospective na-
ture of the Act.54 Unlike the Attorney General's 1988 proposal, which
would have authorized debarment on the basis of convictions or judg-
ments entered on pleas of nolo contendere as far back as 1980," 5 the
Act looks only forward. Criminal acts committed prior to July 1,
1989, may be a basis for debarment upon conviction, but only if they
are based on an indictment or criminal information brought after July
1, 1989,56 and obviously if they are not barred by any statutes of limi-
tation.
D. Exclusions from the Act
Certain persons and activities do not fall within the purview of the
Act, and therefore those persons may not be debarred and those activ-
ities may not Serve as a basis for debarment. First, the Act does not
apply to "any activities regulated by the Florida Public Service Com-
mission." '5 7 No legislative history exists which helps to determine the
52. See id.
53. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(b) (1989)).
54. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Policy & Proc., tape recording of
proceedings (Apr. 10, 1989, tape 1) (statement of Rep. Langton on Fla. HB 647 (1989)) (availa-
ble at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
55. Fla. HB 786 (1988) (proposing FLA. STAT. § 287.31(2)(a)(5), (d)).
56. Some confusion arose on this point during legislative debate on the bill. At one point,
the sponsor, Rep. Langton, averred that "any crime ... that occurred before the enactment
date of July 1, 1989, of course would not be considered." Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops.,
tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 12, 1989, tape 1) (statement of Rep. Langton) (available at
Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla.). In fact, the plain terms of the Act refute that assertion. Only the charges or indict-
ment and disposition by a trial court need occur after July 1, 1989, in order for the offense to be
a public entity crime. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
287.133(l)(b) (1989)).
57. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(5) (1989)).
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parameters of this exclusion," but by its very terms the exclusion is
directed to regulated activities rather than regulated persons. There-
fore, a person regulated by the Public Service Commission (PSC) is
still subject to debarment in the event of a conviction for a public
entity crime.
Under the Act, debarment would prohibit such a regulated person
from selling nonregulated goods and services to public entities. How-
ever, debarment would prevent neither a regulated person from pro-
viding regulated goods or services under a franchise or contract nor
the debarred vendor from seeking additional contracts or franchises
with public entities for the provision of regulated services.
Among other things, this exclusion would preclude nullification of
any contract or franchise from a state or local agency under which a
public utility provides regulated services to the public entity or the
general public.59 Thus, it would prevent the interruption of vital public
services from certain regulated monopolies.
Second, the Act does not apply to "the purchase of goods or serv-
ices made by any public entity from the Department of Correc-
tions."60 This exclusion prevents the Act from barring the purchase of
goods and services from the state prison system simply because some
inmates involved in producing those goods and services were con-
victed of a public entity crime. 61
The same objective applies to the third exclusion, which exempts
"the purchase of goods or services ... from the nonprofit corpora-
tion organized under chapter 946."62 This type of corporation serves
as a private sector vehicle for the operation of prison industry pro-
grams. 63 Thus, this exclusion also protects the prison system's rehabili-
tation programs from disqualification.
The fourth exclusion is for "the purchase of goods or services ...
from any accredited nonprofit workshop certified under ss. 413.032-
58. This exclusion was added on the Senate floor. FLA. S. JouR. 398 (Reg. Sess. May 18,
1989) (amendment 4 to Fla. CS for SB 458). However, the amendment was adopted without any
explanation by the sponsor. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 18, 1989, tape 3) (re-
marks of Sen. Johnson) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Man-
agement, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
One authority who participated in the drafting of this exclusion stated that its objective is to
prevent an electric utility from being disqualified from holding public service franchises in Flor-
ida if one of the utility's unregulated subsidiaries commits a public entity crime. Interview with
Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35.
59. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(5)
(1989)).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See FLA. STAT. § 946.504 (1989).
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413.037." 64 This exclusion exempts any nonprofit workshop for blind
or handicapped persons if it is accredited by the Commission for Pur-
chase from the Blind or Other Severely Handicapped for purposes of
selling products and services to state agencies at commission-set
prices .65
II. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATING PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES
The Act imposes new duties on state and local government agencies
and vendors to report convictions that serve as a basis for a disqualifi-
cation proceeding. 66 It also gives the agency charged with implement-
ing the Act, the Department of General Services (DGS), new powers
to conduct investigations to determine whether a debarment proceed-
ing must be held. 67
A. The Duty to Report a Conviction
The Act imposes two different requirements on vendors for the re-
porting of a conviction which would be a basis for a debarment pro-
ceeding. First, any person who bids on contracts with a public entity,
or who otherwise transacts business with a state or local government
agency in Florida, is required to notify DGS within thirty days after a
conviction for a public entity crime applicable to that person. 68 Such a
vendor also must notify DGS after an affiliate has been convicted of a
public entity crime.69
This duty arises upon entry of an adjudication of guilt, or upon a
conviction without an adjudication, and does not depend upon the
outcome of any appellate review of the trial court decision. 70 Because
the duty extends to the reporting of a conviction of an affiliate, those
who do or seek to do business with government agencies in Florida
have an implied obligation at all times to make themselves aware of
the legal status of any vendor which would be an affiliate under the
Act.
64. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(5) (1989)).
65. FLA. STAT. §§ 413.032-.037 (1989).
66. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(b)
(1989)).
67. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(1) (1989)).
68. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(b) (1989)).
69. Id.
70. See id. The Act authorizes debarment even though a convicted person may seek appel-
late review of his conviction. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f) (1989) (establishing
procedure for restoration of qualifications to bid after reversal of conviction on appellate re-
view)). Therefore, the duty to report attaches upon occurrence of the conviction regardless of the
outcome of an appeal.
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A vendor also has a duty to report a conviction at the onset of cer-
tain transactions. The Act requires that any person entering into a
contract with a public entity in excess of a certain amount file a dis-
closure statement on a form to be adopted by DGS.7' On this form,
the vendor is required to disclose its name, its business address, and
whether it or an affiliate has been convicted of a public entity crime
since July 1, 1989.72
Certain circumstances exist in which a vendor need not disclose a
conviction. If a convicted person, or one whose conviction could have
been the basis for a vendor's disqualification, went through a debar-
ment proceeding based on the conviction and was not debarred, then
the vendor filing the disclosure statement need not disclose the convic-
tion. 73 In addition, if a convicted vendor, or one whose conviction
could have been the basis for a person's disqualification, was de-
barred for a conviction but its qualification to bid was restored prior
to expiration of the penalty period, then the vendor filing the disclo-
sure need not disclose the conviction. 74 In all other circumstances, a
conviction for a public entity crime must be disclosed if the conviction
was after July 1, 1989. 71
The Act does not impose a penalty for failure to fulfill either duty
to report a conviction. However, whether one has complied with these
requirements is a factor that must be considered during a debarment
proceeding.7 6 Because the failure to report a conviction may weigh
against a vendor seeking to avoid debarment, the Act creates an incen-
tive for prompt reporting.
A public entity also has a duty to report a conviction of which it is
aware. It must notify DGS within ten days of learning that a person
has been convicted of a public entity crime. 77 The Act specifies that
the notification must be in writing, and further requires that the gov-
ernment agency transmit to DGS information that it has on the con-
viction.7 8 The obligation extends to convictions of any person who
71. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(a) (1989)). Disclosure is required only if the
contract or transaction amounts to more than the "category two" threshold amount. See FLA.
STAT. § 287.017(l)(b) (1989). As of August, 1989, that amount was $3,000. Id. However, the
amount may be adjusted annually by rule, based on changes in a nationally recognized price
index. Id. § 287.017(2)(a); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 13A-1.001(24) (Nov. 1988) (promulgat-
ing specific procedures for indexing by the Division of Purchasing).
72. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(a) (1989)).
73. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(a)(3) (1989)).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(i) (1989)).
77. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(b) (1989)).
78. Id.
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bids on business with the specific agency or otherwise conducts busi-
ness with the agency. This duty does not appear to require a govern-
ment agency to report on convictions of persons who are not doing
business with that agency. In any event, no penalty exists for failing to
do so.
B. The Power to Investigate a Conviction
The Act also authorizes DGS to investigate whenever it receives
"reasonable information" that a person or a vendor's affiliate has
been convicted of a public entity crime. 79 The Act does not specify
what constitutes reasonable information, but typically it could be a
report from a vendor, a competing vendor, or a state or local agency
which recognizes a conviction under the Act.
The requirement that the information be reasonable before DGS
may investigate implies that DGS must take steps to assess the credi-
bility of the information. Ordinarily, DGS may be able to establish
that a conviction had occurred simply by acquiring a certified copy of
the judgment and supporting court records to show that the person
convicted is subject to debarment. Additional information could be
developed through discovery, if the vendor requests a formal debar-
ment hearing. 80
DGS has certain powers to conduct formal investigations to deter-
mine whether a conviction under the Act has occurred.81 The only pre-
condition is that the agency have "reason to believe that a person or
an affiliate has been convicted of a public entity crime." '8 2 This re-
quirement implies that the agency has an obligation to assess the cred-
ibility of a conviction report prior to initiating the formal
investigation. For example, an investigation based solely upon an
anonymous phone call to the agency might subject the vendor to un-
necessary embarrassment and would therefore be an abuse of the
agency's discretion.
This investigatory power should be useful in establishing whether an
affiliate relationship exists between a convicted person and one who
has not been convicted but appears to be otherwise subject to debar-
ment. The agency may require a convicted person, or one who ap-
pears to be an affiliate, to give a deposition, answer interrogatories,
79. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(1) (1989)).
80. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)); see also FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(b)
(1989) (availability of discovery in agency proceedings).
81. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(c) (1989)).
82. Id.
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or produce documents and tangible evidence for inspection and copy-
ing.83
In using these discovery tools, DGS must adhere to the applicable
provisions of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Thus, DGS may
seek relevant information that would not be admissible as evidence so
long as it is calculated to lead to admissible evidence. 5 DGS may not
seek privileged information 6 or work-product materials prepared in
anticipation of litigation. 7 Additionally, DGS may seek an order com-
pelling discovery, 8 and a vendor may seek a protective order.8 9 Either
DGS or the vendor would have to apply to the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings (DOAH) for either type of order. 90
It is not clear whether the agency must adhere to Rule 1.290, Flor-
ida Rules of Civil Procedure, for taking a deposition in preparation
for a formal debarment investigation. On the one hand, the Act pro-
vides that DGS may issue a "written demand" to take a vendor's dep-
osition. 9' The Act is silent on any preliminary requirements which
DGS must meet in order to conduct such an examination. Conceiva-
bly, DGS could require a vendor to give a deposition without any au-
thorization at all from an impartial arbiter.
On the other hand, the Act expressly requires that depositions be
taken in accord with applicable-portions of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. 92 The rules require that depositions be taken after com-
mencement of a civil action; 93 however, the taking of depositions may
be authorized prior to commencement of an action under Rule
1.290. 94 This rule may be interpreted as limiting DGS's discretion to
83. Id. Discovery during a formal investigation may also be effected by deposing and serv-
ing interrogatories and requests to produce on an officer, director, executive, partner, share-
holder, employee, member, or agent of a vendor if that natural person is active in the
management of the vendor, because natural persons meeting those criteria expressly fall within
the definitions of "[affiliate" and "[pierson." Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 287.133(1)(a)(2),
(e) (1989)).
The statute does not authorize the serving of requests for admission during a formal investiga-
tion prior to commencement of a debarment proceeding. Therefore, this means of discovery is
not available to DGS until a petition is filed for a formal hearing under section 120.57(1), Flor-
ida Statutes.
84. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(c) (1989)).
85. See FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.280(b)(1).
86. See id.
87. See id. 1.280(b)(2).
88. See id. 1.380(a).
89. See id. 1.280(c).
90. See id. 1.280(c), 1.380(a)(1).
91. Ch. 89-1 14, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(c) (1989)).
92. Id.
93. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.310(a) (depositions by oral examination); id. 1.320(a) (depositions
upon written questions).
94. See id. 1.290(a).
PUBLIC CONTRACTING LA W
depose vendors prior to initiation of a debarment proceeding. If Rule
1.290 applies to formal investigations, then DGS would be required to
file a verified petition, with DOAH, and receive an order from a hear-
ing officer to depose a vendor prior to initiation of a debarment pro-
ceeding.
This latter interpretation of the Act would seem to be more prudent
for two reasons. First, it would ensure that a proper basis exists for
the conduct of a deposition. Second, it would establish an impartial
forum for the resolution of any dispute that might arise during the
formal investigation. For example, if DGS sought an order to compel,
or if the vendor sought a protective order, a hearing officer would
already have jurisdiction and could quickly resolve the dispute.
The proper procedure for the use of interrogatories and requests for
production during a formal investigation is clearer. The Act author-
izes their use prior to commencement of a debarment proceeding, 95
negating the requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure that an ac-
tion must have been commenced before interrogatories or requests to
produce may be served.9 Unlike the situation with depositions, the
Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a similar procedure for the
use of these discovery devices prior to commencement of an action.
Because the Act expressly authorizes the use of discovery devices prior
to initiation of a debarment proceeding, the Act appears to authorize
DGS to serve interrogatories or requests to produce subject only to its
own rules of procedure.
The Rules of Civil Procedure do provide that a party must respond
to interrogatories and requests to produce within thirty days of serv-
ice, but that a defendant may respond within forty-five days of the
initial service of process.9 A reasonable application of these rules in a
formal investigation preparatory to a debarment proceeding would be
that a vendor would have forty-five days to respond because its posi-
tion would be analogous to a defendant at the onset of a civil action.
III. PROCEDURE FOR DISQUALIFYING A VENDOR
Once DGS has determined that a person has been convicted of a
public entity crime, it must initiate the debarment process as to that
person or an affiliate.98 In a contested case, the debarment proceeding
will result in a final order either allowing the vendor to continue trans-
95. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(c) (1989)).
96. FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.340(a) (interrogatories); id. 1.350(b) (requests to produce).
97. Id. 1.340(a) (interrogatories); id. 1.350(b) (requests to produce).
98. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(1)
(1989)).
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acting business with public entities, or debarring the vendor by placing
its name on a convicted vendor list. 99
A. Proceedings to Debar Persons and Affiliates
The procedure governing a debarment proceeding differs in signifi-
cant respects from ordinary adjudicatory proceedings under chapter
120, Florida Statutes.' °° Where an adjudicatory proceeding typically
results in a recommended order from the DOAH hearing officer'0
and a final order from the agency head,'02 a contested debarment pro-
ceeding will result in a final order from the hearing officer. 103 The Act
requires DGS to refer a petition for a formal debarment proceeding to
DOAH. 104 The Governor and Cabinet, who collectively serve as the
agency head of DGS, 105 do not have final order authority in a debar-
ment proceeding.'°6
The debarment procedure begins when DGS serves on a vendor or
affiliate a written notice of intent to debar. 0 7 Individual notice must
be served on a vendor before it may be debarred. 108 Therefore, the Act
requires that each member in a family of related companies receive
individual notice before it may be disqualified from doing business
with state and local agencies in Florida.
If the vendor wishes to avoid debarment, it must file a petition for a
formal adjudicatory hearing under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes,
99. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d) (1989)).
100. Compare id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)) with FLA. STAT. §
120.57(l)(b)(9) (1989).
101. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1989). An agency head or member of a collegial body
which sits as an agency head may conduct the formal hearing. Id. § 120.57(1)(a)(1). In that
event, a hearing officer would not enter a recommended order for the agency head.
102. Id. § 120.57(l)(b)(10).
103. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d)
(1989)).
104. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(b) (1989)).
105. FLA. STAT. § 20.22(1) (1989).
106. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d)-
(e) (1989)).
107. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(1) (1989)). The statute requires that the no-
tice advise the vendor of the right to a formal hearing, the procedure to be followed, and appli-
cable time requirements. Id. Because such proceedings are governed by section 120.57(1), Florida
Statutes, the notice must conform to requirements for a clear point of entry under the rules of
Florida administrative procedure. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)); see, e.g.,
Capeletti Bros. v. Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (explaining clear
point of entry); see also FLA. ADMrN. CODE R. 28-5.111 (Aug. 1989).
108. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133((3)(e)(1)
(1989)).
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within twenty-one days of receiving the notice of intent from DGS.'°9
If the vendor does not file a petition for a formal hearing within
twenty-one days of notice, DGS must enter a final order disqualifying
the person or affiliate from transacting business with state and local
agencies in Florida for three years. 110
The Act establishes a series of deadlines within which the key steps
in the adjudicatory process must take place. This timetable is consid-
erably shorter than that which ordinarily applies in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings."' The Act requires DGS to refer the petition to DOAH
within five days of filing of the petition and requires the director of
DOAH to appoint, within five days of referral, a hearing officer to
preside over the debarment proceeding.1 1 2
Within thirty days of the appointment, the hearing officer must
conduct a formal evidentiary hearing, unless the parties stipulate to a
later date. 3 Within thirty days of the hearing or the receipt of the
hearing transcript, whichever date is later, the hearing officer must
enter a final order. 1 4 The final order is subject to judicial review in a
district court of appeal as provided in section 120.68, Florida Sta-
tutes. 5
Prior to entry of the final order, the vendor and DGS may negotiate
a settlement. The Act expressly authorizes informal disposition by
stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order." 6 If a settlement is
concluded by DGS and the vendor, the hearing officer is required to
109. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)). Under the rules of Florida admin-
istrative procedure, an informal hearing may be conducted by the agency. The hearing results in
a final order by the agency head. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1989). Thus, a final order after a
formal debarment hearing would have been entered by a hearing officer, but a final order after
an informal debarment hearing could have been entered by DGS. Because this anomaly would
have resulted in different administrative authorities making legally binding interpretations of the
same provisions, the Act does not allow an informal hearing under section 120.57(2), Florida
Statutes, in a debarment proceeding. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)). The prohibition on informal hearings does not prevent
negotiated settlements. See infra text accompanying note 116-17.
110. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(1)
(1989)).
111. Compare id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2) (1989)) with FLA. STAT. §
120.57(l)(b) (1989).
112. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(b)
(1989)).
113. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(c) (1989)).
114. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d) (1989)).
115. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(e) (1989)).
116. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(f) (1989)). Because one may not seek an
informal hearing with the agency, see supra note 108, the proper means to settle a case after
issuance of a notice of intent is to file a petition for a formal hearing and then negotiate a
settlement with DGS. Presumably, the Governor and Cabinet, as agency head of DGS, would
have a role in arriving at a settlement of a debarment proceeding despite their lack of final order
authority. The role of the Governor and Cabinet in such a situation would be a suitable subject
for rulemaking.
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adopt the terms of the settlement in a final order." 7 In this way, the
parties may settle a case on terms which could include, for example, a
period of disqualification of less than thirty-six months.
B. The Public Interest Test
The Act charges the hearing officer with the task of determining
whether it is in the public interest for the vendor to be disqualified
from transacting business with state and local agencies in Florida."'
Although certain presumptions may arise based upon the evidence," 9
DGS bears the burden of proving that the public interest is served by
the debarment of a vendor.'20
This feature of the Act is a significant departure from the 1983
DOT statute and the Attorney General's 1988 proposal. 21 Both of
those earlier measures provided for automatic disqualification of a
vendor upon conviction for a public entity crime, without taking into
account any of the circumstances. 22 This approach was criticized dur-
ing development of the Act because, under such a regimen, no one
would make a reasoned judgment based upon the particulars of each
case. 123
Under the Act, the public interest determination must be made by
examining eleven factors and weighing the evidence adduced as to
each of them. These factors were derived from a list of issues which
the 1983 DOT statute 24 and the Attorney General's 1988 proposal 25
set forth for considering whether to restore the qualifications of a de-
barred vendor. Because those factors did not constitute a public inter-
est test per se, additional factors were added in an attempt to
encompass the whole range of public concerns which might be rele-
vant in a debarment proceeding.
117. Id.
118. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)
(1989)).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 162-7 1.
120. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4)
(1989)).
121. Compare id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3) (1989)) with FLA. STAT. §
337.165(2)(b) (1989) and Fla. HB 786, § 1 (1988) (proposing FLA. STAT. § 287.31(2)(e)).
122. See FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(b) (1989); Fla. HB 786, § 1 (1988) (proposing FLA. STAT. §
287.31 (2)(d)-(e)).
123. Memorandum from William D. Preston and David L. Powell, Att'ys, Hopping Boyd
Green & Sams, to Jerome Hoffman, Chief, Antitrust Section, Div. of Econ. Crimes, Dep't of
Legal Affairs (Nov. 14, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records
Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
124. FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(l)-(d)(6) (1989).
125. Fla. HB 786, § 1 (1988) (proposing FLA. STAT. § 287.31(2)(f)(1)-(f)(6)).
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These eleven factors are points of consideration for the hearing of-
ficer. Determining the public interest in any case is not a matter of
deciding which party prevails in an evidentiary battle on a majority of
the factors. Rather, the hearing officer must come to a judgment
about the public interest based upon the totality of the evidence. In
theory at least, evidence adduced on even one factor in a particular
case may outweigh countervailing evidence on all the others.
1. Conviction for a Public Entity Crime
The first factor in the public interest test is "[w]hether the person or
affiliate committed a public entity crime."1 26 DGS must prove that the
person was convicted, or is an affiliate of one so convicted. If the
agency fails to carry the burden on this issue, then the hearing officer
must enter a final order which does not place the vendor on the con-
victed vendor list.127
Ordinarily, evidence of the conviction of a person will be sufficient.
If a business entity is to be debarred by imputing to it the conviction
of one of its key personnel, 28 then DGS must prove that such an indi-
vidual was "active in management" of the entity. If the vendor is to
be debarred merely on the basis of its status as an affiliate, then DGS
must demonstrate affiliate status by clear and convincing evidence.129
2. Nature and Details of the Offense
The second factor to be considered is "[t]he nature and details of
the public entity crime" which is the basis for the proceeding. 130 This
factor requires the hearing officer to examine the actual offense and
reflect on its particulars in determining the extent to which the crime
itself suggests that the public would be better served by denying the
vendor the opportunity to do business with government agencies.
While any of the enumerated public entity crimes may be the basis
for debarment and guilty vendors surely are deserving of condemna-
126. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(a)
(1989)).
127. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4) (1989)). A vendor should be able to force
DGS to come forward with its proof on this pivotal issue early in the formal proceeding by
service of a motion for summary final order. See FLA. ADIMN. CODE R. 221-6.030 (1986).
A vendor may not prove it has not been convicted of a public entity crime, or that it is not an
affiliate of one so convicted, merely by means of an affidavit. An affidavit to either effect may
be introduced in a debarment proceeding but, without more, is not competent substantial evi-
dence to support a finding of fact on either issue. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(5) (1989)).
128. See Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(e)
(1989)).
129. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4) (1989)).
130. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(b) (1989)).
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tion, some crimes are more pernicious than others. For example, a
distinction may be drawn between swindling the public without the
involvement of government personnel and crimes which include as an
integral feature the corruption of public officials. Distinctions such as
this may be taken into account under this factor.' 3'
3. Degree of the Vendor's Culpability
The third factor is the degree of culpability of the person or affiliate
to be debarred.3 2 Drawn from the 1983 DOT Act,' this factor ena-
bles the hearing officer to consider the relative guilt of the vendor in
the proceeding. If the vendor in the proceeding actually committed the
public entity crime, then this factor would militate toward debarment.
If, however, the vendor facing debarment is only an affiliate of the
person who committed the public entity crime, then this factor might
not weigh as heavily toward disqualification of the vendor.
In addition, this factor allows the hearing officer to consider the
extent to which a vendor condoned the offense. An offense committed
as part of a vendor's conscious policy may weigh more heavily in fa-
vor of debarment than one committed by an employee acting without
direction from superiors or contrary to a vendor's normal procedures.
4. Payment of Damages or Penalties
The fourth factor is the "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any
damages or penalty as a result of the conviction."'13 4 This factor al-
lows the hearing officer to consider whether a convicted person paid
any monetary damages to the agency that was the victim of the public
entity crime which is the basis of the proceeding, or paid any court-
imposed penalty.'35 It is an inducement for vendors to quickly settle
accounts with any governmental victims of bid-rigging crimes.
Also based on a factor in the 1983 DOT Act, 3 6 this factor presents
certain definitional problems. For one thing, it does not make clear
what is meant by "prompt." For another, it does not define "volun-
tary." No one voluntarily pays damages or a fine; one does so be-
cause a court requires it. A reasonable construction of this factor is
that it relates to whether a convicted vendor paid any damages or pen-
131. Id.
132. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(c) (1989)).
133. FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(1) (1989).
134. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(d)
(1989)).
135. See id.
136. FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(2) (1989).
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alty when due without the necessity of the governmental victim insti-
tuting legal proceedings to collect. Thus, the posting of a bond
necessary to undertake an appeal should satisfy this requirement. 13 7
This factor would seem to have limited efficacy in certain debar-
ment proceedings. If the Act is read literally, the failure of a convicted
individual to pay, promptly or voluntarily, any damages or penalty
related to a conviction could be used against his corporate employer
even though the employer may not have had any power over whether
the penalty or damages were paid. Given the concern that vendors not
be unfairly debarred simply on the basis of their association with
someone who has been convicted,' such a construction should be
avoided when an employer who has not been convicted of any wrong-
doing is nevertheless subject to debarment on the basis of another's
crime.
5. Cooperation with the Authorities
The fifth factor to be considered is "[clooperation with state or fed-
eral investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime."' 3 9 Also
based on a similar factor in the 1983 DOT statute, 140 this factor allows
the introduction of evidence that the vendor has cooperated, or failed
to cooperate, with the authorities in investigating or prosecuting a
public entity crime.' 41 The evidence of cooperation need not relate to
the crime which triggered the debarment proceeding. 142
This factor is limited by a proviso which precludes the hearing offi-
cer from considering as a lack of cooperation any "good faith exercise
of any constitutional, statutory, or other right during any portion of
the investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime.' ' 43 This
137. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(1), (c)(1)-(2). This interpretation is supported by the pro-
vision creating a presumption that a vendor should not be debarred if it takes certain remedial
steps, including the "prompt payment of damages, or posting of a bond." Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989
Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k) (1989)) (emphasis added). Those
who took part in the drafting of this legislation concur in this interpretation. See Interview with
Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35.
138. This concern is most clearly seen in the requirement that a vendor not be debarred as an
affiliate without clear and convincing evidence of affiliate status. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla.
Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4) (1989)); see supra text accompanying
note 34.
139. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(e)
(1989)).
140. FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(3) (1989).
141. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)
(3)(e) (1989)).
142. See id. The hearing officer must consider cooperation in the investigation of any public
entity crime.
143. Id.
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language was included, among other reasons, to ensure that a ven-
dor's plea of not guilty in a criminal proceeding could not be consid-
ered a lack of cooperation with the authorities in any subsequent
debarment proceeding. I"
A vendor's assertion of any procedural rights in the debarment pro-
ceeding itself should not be counted against it. Because that proceed-
ing does not exist for the purpose of the "investigation or prosecution
of a public entity crime, 145 the exercise of any legislatively authorized
rights in the debarment proceeding would not hinder law enforcement
officers in the ferreting out of public entity crimes.
6. Disassociation from Those Convicted
The sixth factor in the public interest test is "[d]isassociation from
any other persons or affiliates convicted of the public entity crime."14 6
This factor is similar to a factor in the 1983 DOT Act, but it appears
to be framed more narrowly than that factor because it focuses only
on those "convicted of the public entity crime" which triggered the
proceeding rather than those "involved" in the crime. 47
This factor may be examined in varying ways, depending upon the
facts of the case. If the offense which triggered the proceeding was
committed by any "officers, directors, executives, partners, share-
holders, employees, members, and agents who are active in manage-
ment,' ' 48 the vendor would have to take whatever steps were
necessary to sever the relationship, such as discharging the culpable
employee. In the case of an entity with affiliate status as the successor
of a convicted entity, satisfying this criterion would seem to require
the impossible task of rewriting history.
7. Self-Policing to Prevent Public Entity Crimes
The seventh factor to be considered is "[p]rior or future self-polic-
ing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes.' ' 49 Sig-
nificantly, this factor is broad enough to allow a vendor facing
debarment to introduce evidence that it conducted a self-policing pro-
gram prior to the conviction or that it has established a program since
the offense in order to prevent a recurrence.
144. Interview with Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35.
145. See ch. 89-114, § 1, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.132) (1989)).
146. Id. § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(f) (1989)).
147. Compare id. with FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(4) (1989).
148. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(e) (1989)).
149. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(g) (1989)).
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The Act does not specify what constitutes self-policing, so vendors
have no guidelines as to what efforts might be relevant under this fac-
tor. Therefore, vendors should be creative and aggressive in develop-
ing internal programs to educate managers and employees as to what
actions occurring during the course of seeking business from public
entities, whether committed with criminal intent or inadvertently,
would constitute a proscribed offense.
8. Reinstatement or Clemency
The eighth factor in the public interest test is "[r]einstatement or
clemency in any jurisdiction in relation to the public entity crime at
issue in the proceeding."' 50 Under this factor, a hearing officer in a
Florida debarment proceeding may take into account how other juris-
dictions have treated the crime at issue. For example, the hearing offi-
cer can consider whether the originating jurisdiction has removed any
disability by restoring the vendor's right to bid on and receive public
contracts. Alternatively, a hearing officer may consider whether the
vendor has received a pardon or other form of clemency for the public
entity crime. 5'
In most cases, this factor will not be significant because DGS will
initiate debarment soon after conviction-indeed, perhaps while the
underlying conviction is on appeal-so that the convicted person will
not have had sufficient opportunity to seek reinstatement or clem-
ency.
9. Notification of DGS
The ninth factor is "[c]ompliance by the person or affiliate with the
notification provisions" which require a vendor to report to DGS
when it or an affiliate has been convicted of a public entity crime. 152
As discussed earlier, the Act imposes two duties on vendors who do
business, or who wish to do so, with state or local agencies in Flor-
ida.' The Act requires a vendor, prior to entering into a contract, to
disclose whether it or an affiliate has been convicted of a public entity
crime since July 1, 1989.14 Furthermore, a person must notify DGS
within thirty days of being convicted, or an affiliate's being convicted,
of a public entity crime.'55
150. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(h) (1989)).
151. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(1)-(2) (1989)) (removal proceedings).
152. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(i) (1989)).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
154. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(a)(3)
(1989)).
155. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(b) (1989)).
1990]
506 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:481
This factor allows the hearing officer to consider whether the ven-
dor has discharged its legal duties. If a vendor duly reports a convic-
tion, such compliance may militate against debarment. Failure to
comply, on the other hand, would militate in favor of disqualifica-
tion. Thus, inclusion of this factor creates an incentive for vendors to
comply with the reporting requirements of the Act.
10. Need for Market Competition
The tenth factor to be considered is "[t]he needs of public entities
for additional competition in the procurement of goods and services
in their respective markets."' 56 Based upon a factor in the 1983 DOT
statute,57 it directs the hearing officer's inquiry to the effects of de-
barment on the state and local agencies which otherwise would be able
to do business with the debarred vendor, and through them, the pub-
lic at large. This factor allows both DGS and the vendor to adduce
evidence directed to the issue of whether debarring the vendor would
adversely effect state or local government agencies in procuring what-
ever goods or services the vendor provides.
In addition, this factor provides a basis for state or local agencies to
intervene in a debarment proceeding directed at a vendor by whom
they are served. A government agency could intervene in a debarment
proceeding because its substantial interests would be affected by the
proceeding through loss of a needed supplier.'58
11. Mitigation for Good Citizenship
The eleventh factor in the public interest test is "[m]itigation based
upon any demonstration of good citizenship by the person or affili-
ate." 59 The good deeds ordinarily brought before the hearing officer
to address this factor could be past or future, one-time-only or contin-
uing commitments. 60
This factor is a catch-all designed to allow a vendor to show any
socially responsible acts which would be a basis to conclude that the
public would be better served by allowing the vendor to continue do-
ing business with government agencies. Under this factor, the hearing
officer could consider either past good deeds of the vendor or the ef-
fect of debarment on a vendor's pattern of civic activity and philan-
156. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(j) (1989)).
157. See FLA. STAT. § 337.165(2)(d)(6) (1989).
158. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 221-6.010 (1986) (intervention).
159. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k)
(1989)).
160. See id. The provision considers any demonstration of good citizenship.
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thropy. Such considerations are not unprecedented in Florida in
proceedings of this nature.'
6
'
C. Presumptions
The Act creates a series of presumptions that a hearing officer must
take into account during a debarment proceeding. These presumptions
serve to shift the burdens of production and persuasion back and
forth between the parties, depending upon the evidence adduced. As
already discussed, DGS initially must demonstrate that a person has
been convicted, or is an affiliate of a person so convicted. 62 Thus, the
presumption at the outset of a debarment proceeding is that debar-
ment of the vendor would not be in the public interest.
Once DGS has proved that a person has been convicted, or that one
is an affiliate of such a person, then it has made a prima facie show-
ing that the public interest would be better served by disqualifica-
tion. 63 In other words, such evidence constitutes competent
substantial evidence to support a final order of debarment. Without
any other evidence, the hearing officer should order the vendor placed
on the convicted vendor list. In effect then, a new presumption arises
that a vendor should be debarred.
The vendor may overcome this presumption and create a new pre-
sumption in its favor by adducing evidence on three issues drawn
from the public interest test. The issues are (1) the prompt payment of
damages or the posting of a bond necessary to prosecute an appeal;'6
(2) cooperation with the investigation or prosecution of a public entity
crime; 65 and (3) "termination of the employment or other relation-
ship with the employee or other natural person responsible for the
public entity crime."' Evidence establishing these facts will create a
new presumption that it would not be in the public interest to debar
the vendor.16 7
161. See, e.g., Department of Bus. Reg., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. South-
land Corp. (July 31, 1987) (DOAH Case No. 86-2247) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau
of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
162. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4)
(1989)); see supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
163. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(4)
(1989)).
164. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k) (1989)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k) (1989)). Unfortunately, the placement
of this provision creates the potential for mistaking it as part of the factor in the public interest
test relating to mitigation for demonstrations of good citizenship. In fact, it is not related to the
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Known as the "cleansing" provision, 68 this provision represents
one of the Act's more creative features. It serves as a powerful induce-
ment for a convicted vendor to pay damages quickly or post a super-
sedeas bond, to cooperate with the authorities, and to discharge
culpable employees. However, the presumption created by the
"cleansing" provision may be rebutted by DGS.169
Even if a vendor does not come forward with sufficient evidence to
create this last presumption in its favor, it may still prevail. The Act
expressly provides that, upon a prima facie showing by DGS, a person
or affiliate may prove by a preponderance of the evidence that debar-
ment would not be in the public interest.'70 Thus, with sufficient evi-
dence, the vendor could prevail even without satisfying the
requirements of the cleansing provision. 7'
IV. DEBARMENT
If the hearing officer concludes that it would be in the public inter-
est to disqualify a vendor, a final order of debarment must be entered.
Technically, debarment takes the form of an order to place a vendor
mitigation criterion.
This provision was offered as a substitute for another version which contained express cross-
references to criteria in the public interest test. Compare FLA. S. JoUtr. 398 (Reg. Sess. May 18,
1989) (amendment 3 to Fla. CS for SB 458 (1989)) with id. (amendment 2 to Fla. CS for SB 458
(1989)). Two authorities who participated in drafting these amendments stated that the substitute
was not intended to depart from the parameters of the corresponding criteria in the public inter-
est test. Interview with Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35; Interview with S. James Brainerd,
General Counsel, Florida Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 22, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). In
fact, the substitute was merely an earlier version of the cleansing provision. The fact that it was
offered as a substitute for the subsequent, more refined version was nothing more than a vagary
of the legislative process. Id.
168. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 18, 1989, tape 3) (remarks of Sen. Johnson)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
169. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k)
(1989)).
170. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(5) (1989)).
171. For example, suppose Company X faces debarment because it and its only competitor,
Company W, agreed to rig their bids for some contracts for widget purchases by the Florida
Department of Widgets. Company X has paid the damages and penalty arising from the convic-
tion of it and its owner, Mr. X. It has also cooperated with the authorities in investigating and
convicting other bid-riggers. Because it is a sole proprietorship, it has not disassociated itself
from Mr. X, and therefore cannot create a presumption against debarment. Company W, on the
other hand, has taken all steps necessary to create a presumption against debarment in its favor.
Over the years, Company X has been a major financial supporter of several charities. In addi-
tion, if Company X is debarred, Company W will have a monopoly on widget sales to govern-
ment agencies in Florida, a prospect which alarms many local governments. For these reasons,
the hearing officer finds it would not be in the public interest to debar Company X even though
Mr. X still owns the firm.
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on a convicted vendor list172 which DGS will compile and regularly
update. "I
A. Effective Date and Duration
The purpose of the convicted vendor list is to provide regular notifi-
cation to all state and local agencies in Florida, and all bidders, of
those vendors with whom the agencies may not do business by virtue
of debarment.' 74 The initial list must be compiled by DGS and be pub-
lished in the Florida Administrative Weekly by January 1, 1990. 71
Thereafter, every three months DGS must prepare and publish a re-
vised list which shows any vendors which either have been added to
the list or removed from it.176
Inevitably, a lapse in time will occur between an order of debarment
and publication of an updated list showing that the vendor has been
debarred. Accordingly, the Act provides that disqualification from
public contracting shall be effective upon entry of the final order of
debarment, not upon publication of the revised convicted vendor list
which first includes the vendor's name. 177
The Act also provides that a vendor shall be disqualified under the
Act "for a period of 36 months from the date of being placed on the
convicted vendor list." 7 8 Accordingly, the Act does not appear to give
a hearing officer discretion to resolve a debarment proceeding by dis-
qualifying a vendor for less than three years.
However, the Act encourages settlements of debarment proceed-
ings. It expressly requires a hearing officer to enter a final order
adopting any "stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order"
adopted by the parties to a debarment proceeding. 79 Because it is in
the nature of settlements to agree on sanctions of less than the maxi-
mum provided by law, the parties could decide on a period of debar-
ment of less than three years and the hearing officer would be bound
by the decision.
172. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d)
(1989)).
173. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(d) (1989)).
174. Interview with Jerome W. Hoffman, supra note 35.
175. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(d)
(1989)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(a)-(b) (1989)).
179. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(f) (1989)).
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B. Extent of Disqualification
The extent of disqualification is explicit and sweeping:
A person or affiliate who has been placed on the convicted vendor
list following a conviction for a public entity crime may not submit a
bid on a contract to provide any goods or services to a public entity,
may not be awarded or perform work as a contractor, supplier,
subcontractor, or consultant under a contract with any public entity,
and may not transact business with any public entity in excess of the
threshold amount provided in s. 287.017 for CATEGORY
TWO .... 180
Several features of this provision are noteworthy. First, the disqualifi-
cation covers all purchases by public entities of more than the "CAT-
EGORY TWO" amount. 8 ' Thus, any act of procurement, whether
subject to competitive bidding, competitive negotiation, or otherwise,
is covered by the Act; a debarred vendor may not take part in furnish-
ing anything to a public entity.
Second, the Act prohibits not only direct transactions between gov-
ernment agencies and vendors on the convicted vendor list, but also
indirect transactions in which a debarred vendor serves as a subcon-
tractor or supplier to a prime contractor who actually would enter
into a contract with the public entity. 8 2 For this reason, contractors
and public entities must determine whether any subcontractors or sup-
pliers in contract bids have been debarred.' 83
Third, debarment covers all transactions involving the purchase of
"goods or services" by public entities. As such, it covers transactions
whether they are governed by competitive bidding statutes,'14 the Con-
sultants' Competitive Negotiation Act,'85 or any other procurement
180. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(a) (1989)).
181. Id.; see also supra note 71. This low threshold brings within the purview of the Act all
but the smallest government procurement contracts. Consequently, large regional and national
corporations are not the only vendors which could face the prospect of debarment upon a con-
viction. Small businesses may face debarment proceedings as well.
Because of small businesses' limited resources, they could prevail on the merits but still suffer
significant adverse consequences because of the high cost of litigation. For such vendors, Florida
law provides a limited remedy in the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. See FLA. STAT. §
57.111 (1989). This statute provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs for certain small
businesses which prevail in administrative or civil proceedings initiated against them by the state
"unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which
would make the award unjust." Id. § 57.11 l(4)(a). Because of this limitation, the remedy pro-
vided by this statute may be more theoretical than real.
182. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(a) (1989)).
183. See id.
184. FLA. STAT. §§ 287.057, .062 (1989).
185. Id. § 287.055.
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statute.86 In particular, a debarred vendor may not enter into any
transaction with a public entity, regardless of whether the transaction
involves the same kind of good or service which was at issue in the
public entity crime which resulted in the debarment.
Although the terms "goods" and "services" are not defined in the
Act, their use is significant. Elsewhere, chapter 287, Florida Statutes,
employs the terms of art "commodity, ' ' 8 7 "contractual service,"' 88
and "professional services." 8 9
The term "goods" means "tangible movable personal property
having intrinsic value usu[ally] excluding money."'' 9 As defined in
Chapter 287, the term "commodity" includes "any of the various
supplies, materials, goods, merchandise, class B printing, equipment,
and other personal property purchased, leased, or otherwise con-
tracted for by the state and its agencies,"' 9 Although the term
"goods" is one of those subsumed by the broad definition of com-
modities in chapter 287, the two terms would seem to be co-extensive
because both cover a broad range of items of personal property. 192
Grasping the breadth of the term "service" is more difficult. Its
common meaning is "useful labor that does not produce a tangible
commodity."' 93 This all-encompassing definition stands in stark con-
trast to the terms of art used in chapter 287, Florida Statutes.
Contractual services include "the rendering by a contractor of its
time and effort" in various professional, managerial, and technical
fields. '94 Although a wide range of services are excluded from this def-
inition under chapter 287,195 those services nevertheless constitute use-
ful labors that do not produce tangible commodities, and should be
considered services for purposes of the Act.
Professional services include the practice of architecture, engineer-
ing, and other specified disciplines. 196 The acquisition of these services
is governed by the Consultants' Competitive Negotiation Act. 97 How-
ever, these professional services constitute useful labors that do not
produce tangible commodities; so they too should be considered to be
186. See id. § 287.059, .0595.
187. Id. § 287.012(3).
188. Id. § 287.012(4).
189. Id. § 287.055(2)(a).
190. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 978 (1986).
191. FLA. STAT. § 287.012(3) (1989).
192. Compare id. with WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 978 (1986).
193. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2075 (1986).
194. FLA. STAT. § 287.012(4)(a) (1989).
195. See id. § 287.012(4)(b).
196. Id. § 287.055(2)(a).
197. See id. § 287.055.
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services for purposes of the Act. At a minimum, the term "services"
appears to cover those persons subject to competitive bidding for con-
tractual services, those whose work is excluded from the term "con-
tractual services," and those whose work is subject to the
Consultants' Competitive Negotiation Act. 198 Indeed, it is not clear
what labor, if any, would not be a service within the meaning of the
Act.
C. Anticircumvention Provisions
The Act includes three principal provisions to ensure that a de-
barred vendor does not circumvent the statute and avoid the penaliz-
ing effects of debarment. Perhaps the most important provision
operates to debar an affiliate of a convicted vendor. The definition of
affiliate includes successors of a convicted person.199 Therefore, a per-
son who has been debarred may not circumvent the Act by creating a
new corporate vehicle and transferring to it all assets, including con-
tracts and franchises with state or local governments. 200
The second anticircumvention provision prevents a debarred vendor
from setting up a joint venture with another vendor for purposes of
entering into business transactions the debarred vendor could not con-
duct. A person who knowingly enters a joint venture with a vendor
convicted of a public entity crime in Florida during the preceding
three years also is considered an affiliate of the debarred vendor and
thus becomes subject to debarment. 20 1 The joint venture itself is tech-
nically not subject to disqualification, but a partner of a convicted
vendor would be subject to disqualification, thus creating a powerful
disincentive for entering into such an arrangement. 20 2
The third anticircumvention provision is aimed at a corporate rela-
tive which does not technically meet the definition of an affiliate of a
convicted person. A vendor "under the same, or substantially the
same, control" as a disqualified person may not conduct business
with any public entity which was transacting business with the disqual-
ified person at the time of the commission of the public entity crime
which resulted in the disqualified person being placed on the convicted
198. See id. § 287.012(4)(a), (b), .055(2)(a).
199. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)(1)
(1989)).
200. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133((2) (1989)).
201. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)(2) (1989)); see text accompanying supra note
43.
202. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(1)(a)(2)
(1989)).
PUBLIC CONTRACTING LA W
vendor list.2°3 This provision prohibits certain business transactions by
a corporate relative of a debarred vendor even though that relative is
not an affiliate or otherwise subject to debarment. 2°4 This provision
operates to prohibit large corporations with multiple subsidiaries from
simply deploying a different subsidiary to conduct public business that
had been transacted by a debarred subsidiary.
This third provision suffers, however, from two defects. First, the
Act does not provide any benchmarks for determining when one is
under "the same, or substantially the same, control" as a debarred
vendor. 25 By contrast, the Act suggests two tests for determining
when one person controls another for purposes of determining affili-
ate status. 2°6 Second, because corporate relatives which are not affili-
ates are not subject to debarment, the Act does not establish a
mechanism for enforcing this prohibition. Enforcement is left to local
governments, presumably with the assistance of vigilant competitors.
D. Nullification of Contracts and Franchises
Although the Act describes the debarment process as being some-
thing other than a penalty for wrongdoing, 2°7 in fact the Legislature
provided severe sanctions for convicted vendors. Perhaps the most se-
rious sanction is the potential nullification of existing contracts or
franchises with state and local governments. 2°
Generally, the Act provides that neither a vendor's conviction for a
public entity crime nor its debarment shall "affect any rights or obli-
gations under any contract, franchise, or other binding agreement
which predates such conviction or placement on the convicted vendor
list."209 This provision precludes the disqualification of a vendor un-
203. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(b)
(1989)).
204. Suppose Company X and Company Y are wholly owned Florida subsidiaries of XYZ
International. Company X sells pencils to City A but does no business with City B. Company X
is convicted of a public entity crime and debarred for three years. Company Y is not an affiliate
of Company X, so it is not subject to debarment.
City A then requests bids for erasers, and City B requests bids for pencils. Because it has been
debarred, Company X may not bid on the eraser contract with City A or the pencil contract with
City B. In addition, Company Y may not bid on the eraser contract because Company X had a
contract with City A when it committed the crime, and Company Y is under the same control as
Company X, namely, XYZ International. Company Y may bid on the pencil contract with City
B because Company X was not doing business with City B when it committed the crime.
205. See ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(2)(b)
(1989)).
206. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(l)(a)(2) (1989)).
207. Id. § 1, 1989 Fla. Laws at 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.132(3)-(4) (1989)).
208. See id. § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws at 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(4) (1989)).
209. Id.
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der the Act from constituting a per se cancellation of any contract or
franchise into which the debarred vendor entered prior to a final order
of debarment, including any contract or franchise that may have been
at issue in the underlying public entity crime.210 Thus, a final order of
debarment will not disrupt any previously contracted business transac-
tions between a vendor and a state or local agency.
An exception to this rule exists. Under certain circumstances, the
hearing officer, as part of the final order of debarment, may declare a
contract, franchise, or other binding agreement between a debarred
vendor and a public entity voidable at the option of either the public
entity or the vendor.2 1' However, certain conditions must be met. The
contract or franchise must be specifically identified by the hearing of-
ficer in the final order of debarment. 21 2 The contract also must have
been entered into between a public entity and the debarred vendor af-
ter July 1, 1989.213
A vendor is not without recourse when facing the potential nullifi-
cation of existing contracts or franchises. A vendor may protect its
existing contracts or franchises from being rendered voidable by satis-
fying the three criteria of the public interest test. 214 A vendor subject
to debarment may not have any existing contracts or franchises de-
clared voidable during a debarment proceeding if it promptly or vol-
untarily pays any damages or penalty, disassociates itself from any
other persons or affiliates convicted of the public entity crime, and
demonstrates a prior or future self-policing program to prevent public
entity crimes. 215
This provision is one of the more creative features of the Act. In
effect, it creates a compelling incentive for a vendor to take certain
remedial and preventive actions that are in the public interest. In addi-
tion, the provision creates an opportunity for state or local agencies
which are not parties to a debarment proceeding to intervene if their
contracts or franchises with the vendor might be subject to nullifica-
tion.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. The Act provides that a hearing officer may declare voidable "any specific contract,
franchise, or other binding agreement" between a debarred vendor and a public entity. Id. (em-
phasis added). Thus, only those contracts or franchises specifically identified by the hearing
officer in a final order of debarment may be rendered voidable. Accordingly, a public entity may
not rely on the mere fact that a vendor has been debarred to justify abrogation of a contract or
franchise between it and the vendor.
213. Id.
214. Id. For a discussion of these three criteria in the public interest test, see supra text
accompanying notes 134-38 and 146-49.
215. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(4)(b)
(1989)).
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V. RESTORATION OF QUALIFICATIONS
A debarred vendor may be restored to the public contracting proc-
ess prior to completing a three-year period of disqualification under
two circumstances-the legal negation of the conviction, or a determi-
nation by a hearing officer that it would be in the public interest to
restore the vendor to the public contracting process. Each of these
grounds has separate procedural requirements.
A. Grounds for Removal from the Convicted Vendor List
A debarred vendor may petition for removal from the convicted
vendor list-in effect, petitioning for restoration of its right to partici-
pate in the public contracting process-if the conviction upon which
debarment was based has been reversed on appeal, or if the vendor
has been pardoned.2 1 6 A vendor may seek removal from the list based
on these grounds at any time.217 This provision applies to either a de-
barred person or a debarred affiliate. 218 Thus, an affiliate could seek
removal from the list if the vendor whose conviction formed the basis
for the affiliate's disqualification won a reversal of its conviction.
Otherwise, a disqualified vendor may seek removal from the con-
victed vendor list only by demonstrating that it would be in the public
interest to restore its right to conduct public business. 21 9 Removal on
these grounds may be sought no sooner than six months after entry of
a final order of debarment. 2 0 In addition, a vendor may not seek re-
moval on this ground within nine months of denial of a petition for
removal 221
B. Removal Procedure
In either circumstance, the vendor must file a petition for removal
with DGS.222 The removal proceeding is to be conducted according to
the requirements for a debarment proceeding. 223 Thus, DGS is author-
ized to refer the matter to DOAH for assignment of a hearing officer
within five days of receiving the petition,2 24 and DGS is considered a
216. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(1)
(1989)).
217. Id.
218. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(f)(2) (1989)).
219. Id.
220. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(1) (1989)).
221. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(3) (1989)).
222. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(1) (1989)).
223. Id.
224. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(b) (1989)).
19901
516 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 17:481
party to the proceeding for all purposes. 225 The removal hearing
should be conducted no more than thirty days after assignment of a
hearing officer unless the parties agree otherwise. 226 The hearing offi-
cer must enter a final, appealable order within thirty days after the
hearing or receipt of the transcript, whichever occurs later. 227
When the ground for removal is a pardon or reversal of the under-
lying conviction, the hearing officer has no discretion. The hearing
officer must determine that removal is in the public interest and enter
a final order of removal. 228 The only requirement is that the vendor
present "proof" that the underlying conviction has been reversed or
pardoned. 229 Although the proof may be disputed, a certified copy of
the mandate of an appellate court or a pardon should be sufficient. 230
If the vendor offers other grounds for removal, the hearing officer
must make a public interest determination using the same criteria that
were considered when the vendor was debarred. 21' In that event, the
vendor and DGS adduce evidence addressing each of the eleven issues
in the statutory public interest test. Because the same criteria guide a
removal proceeding as guided the debarment proceeding, a debarred
vendor should seek removal only when it can demonstrate a signifi-
cant change in the relevant facts. For example, a vendor who could
not demonstrate the facts necessary to create a presumption that it
should not be disqualified during its initial debarment hearing23 2 might
find it advantageous to seek removal only if circumstances had
changed so that it could prove those facts.233
Two procedural avenues exist for concluding a removal proceeding
without an evidentiary hearing. Either may be employed no matter
which grounds a vendor offered for removal. However, these short-
225. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(a) (1989)).
226. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(c) (1989)).
227. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(d) (1989)).
228. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(f)(2) (1989)).
229. Id.
230. See FLA. STAT. § 90.902(1) (1989). Certified copies of court records are self-authenticat-
ing.
231. Id.
232. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(3)(k) (1989)).
233. Assume that at its debarment hearing, Company X proved that it had paid the damages
and penalty in its plea-bargained deal with prosecutors. It also proved that it had cooperated
with investigators. However, Company X had not discharged the executive who actually com-
mitted the public entity crime, and Company X was subsequently debarred.
After discharging that executive and waiting six months, Company X seeks removal from the
convicted vendor list. Company X must be removed from the list because it can now meet all
three criteria that create the presumption that it should not be disqualified from the public con-
tracting process-unless, of course, DGS can rebut the presumption created in favor of Com-
pany X.
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cuts would seem to be particularly appropriate if the underlying con-
viction has been reversed or the vendor has been pardoned, or if the
vendor and DGS otherwise agree that removal is appropriate.
First, the vendor and DGS may enter into a stipulation which the
hearing officer would then be bound to accept. 234 Second, either party
may serve a motion for summary final order based upon the facts al-
leged in the petition or responsive pleading. 235 In either event, the need
for a full-fledged hearing would be avoided, conserving the resources
of DOAH and the parties and, if the vendor's disqualification is to be
removed, quickly restoring the vendor to the public contracting proc-
ess with all the attendant public benefits of enhanced competition in
the marketplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
During its 1989 Regular Session, the Legislature enacted legislation
to exclude vendors from the public procurement process in Florida
after a conviction for certain economic crimes which fall under the
rubric of "bid-rigging." The underlying premise is that the opportu-
nity to do business with state and local agencies is a privilege, not a
right, and the government may choose not to favor convicted bid-rig-
gers with its patronage.
At the behest of Attorney General Butterworth, the Legislature
turned away from the blanket approach which had been found want-
ing the previous year. Instead, lawmakers mandated debarment of
convicted vendors and related companies only when the public inter-
est, as determined by a case-by-case examination of eleven issues,
would be better served by doing so. Further, the Legislature created a
debarment procedure which includes important procedural safeguards
for vendors, such as vesting impartial hearing officers with the power
to make debarment decisions. Lastly, the Legislature agreed that de-
barred vendors should be restored to the public contracting process
when circumstances warrant, again based on a public interest determi-
nation by an impartial hearing officer.
The Act still must be tested in the cauldron of case-by-case adjudi-
cations. Yet it holds out the promise of safeguarding the public treas-
ury while still protecting vendors from the specter of unfair
interference in their business transactions with state and local agen-
cies.
234. Ch. 89-114, § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws 307, 308 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 287.133(3)(e)(2)(f)
(1989)).
235. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 221-6.030(1) (1986) (summary final orders).
1990]

